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Introduction 
in the exchange of wages for services, feelings of equitable or 
inequitable treatment may be experienced if an individual considers him­
self justly or unjustly recompensed for his services, effort, abilities, 
or other contribution to the task. The concept "felt inequity" is con­
ceived as synonymous with "acutely felt injustice" and as relevant to 
"any social situation in which exchange takes place, explicitly or 
implicitly" when "there are expectations of what is a fair exchange". 
(Adams, 1965, p 276). 
Equity theory (Adams, 1963a, 1965) purports to predict the behavior 
of individuals in situations characterized by such real or imagined 
disparity or inequity. Several studies have supported equity theory 
predictions, but a number of authors have criticized the theory and 
the supporting research. The most damaging criticism is that the pro­
cedures employed to create inequity result in a stronger threat to 
feelings of self-esteem and competence than to feelings of just treatment. 
Certain suggestions by the critics and the findings of unrelated studies 
support the notion that the variable "self-esteem" moderates response to 
inequitable treatment, though no one has yet directly proposed this in 
the context of the equity theory literature. Consequently, the present 
study will investigate the moderating effects of subjective level of 
self-esteem on responses to manipuidleu eyulLdulc or Inequitable pcy-crt. 
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Equity Theory 
Definition of variables 
Adams (1963a) has defined equity as a perceived correspondence 
between the input (l) - outcome (O) ratio of Person (P) and that of his 
comparison other (A), for a given task, inputs may be any attributes, 
abilities, or effort P contributes to performance on a task, and out­
comes may be any wages, satisfactions, or perquisites realized by P as 
a result of participation in the task. While inputs and outcomes may 
be conceptualized as independent (Adams, 1965) they are in fact 
imperfectly correlated. It is this imperfect correlation which for 
Adams justifies a concept like equity. Equity thus implies a set of 
"learned normative expectations" as to what the level of correlation 
between inputs and outcomes should be. 
in order for inequity to occur, P and A must be involved in a task 
relevant exchange comparison. Further, a given input and/or outcome 
must be recognized by P as relevant to the comparison of his and A's 
1-0 ratios. Felt inequity may thus be due to anything inducing per­
ceived inequality in the expression 0/1 = 0 /I (Adams, 1965). 
P p a a 
The various comparison situations in which this may occur can be 
delineated as perceived disparity between outcomes (Inputs held constant), 
between inputs (outcomes held constant), or between resultant ratios of 
differing ieveis of inputs and ouLcoiiics. T%6 exchange situation need 
not be direct, and in research an equity theory, it typically has not 
been such that P is rewarded for some performance by A. The comparison 
other may be P himself in another previous or anticipated situation and 
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thus not the other member of an interacting dyad, or A may be someone 
(e.g., co-worker) with whom P compares the relative fruits of his and 
A's exchanges with a third party (e.g., employer). 
Equity theory predictions 
Equity theory contains two postulates: (1) tension is created in 
proportion to the amount of inequity present, and (2) this tension will 
motivate the person to eliminate or reduce the inequity In proportion 
to the amount of tension (Adams, 1965). Initially the theory was 
stated in the form of the following two rather general predictions. 
"Within certain limits of inequity there will be a tendency on the part 
of Person to manipulate and weigh cognitively his own inputs and out­
comes and those of Other in such a manner as to minimize the degree of 
felt inequity." "Beyond the limits of inequity the tendency will be 
to manipulate and weigh inputs and outcomes so as to maximize the 
inequity . . . this will increase the motivation to adopt behavior that 
will eliminate the inequity entirely" (Adams, 1963a, p. 427). 
In a more recent theoretical article, Adams (1965) is more explicit, 
specifying six possible ways P might minimize the degree of felt inequity. 
(1) Person (feeling inequity) may alter his inputs. Increasing inputs 
will reduce advantageous inequity (0 /I > 0 /I ) and decreasing inputs 
p p a a 
will reduce disadvantageous inequity (0/1 <0/1 ). (2) Person may 
n r» A A 
alter his outcomes, increasing outcomes in disadvantageous inequity and 
decreasing outcomes in advantageous inequity. (3) Person may distort 
his inputs and outcomes cognitively, in a manner similar to the behav­
ioral changes predicted in 1 and 2 above. For example, in advantageous 
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inequity P may derogate his outcomes or view himself as more competent 
than he initially thought himself to be. (4) Person may leave the field, 
remove himself from the situation which involves the inequitable com­
parison, e.g. quitting his job. (5) Person may attempt to induce his 
comparison other to change inputs or outcomes, though Adams (1965) 
indicates that there is no evidence to suggest this ever occurs. 
(6) Person may change the object of his comparison, resulting in a 
severed dyad or a shift in point of focus in a triad or larger group. 
Alteration of inputs (e.g., 1 or 3 above) as an inequity reduction 
scheme is more likely than alteration of outcomes, since in most situa­
tions inputs (e.g. effort) are more manipulable by P than are outcomes 
(e.g. rate of pay). Manipulation of inputs may, however, affect 
perceived level of outcomes in the ratio. Also, a manipulation involv­
ing lowering outcomes would be akin to increasing costs and violate one 
of the following guiding conditions covering choice of mode of inequity 
reduction. 
There are six postulates guiding selection of any of the above 
modes of inequity reduction (Adams, 1965): (1) Person will attempt to 
maximize positively valent outcomes and the valence of outcomes; 
(2) Person will minimize costly and effortful inputs; (3) Person will 
resist real and cognitive changes in inputs and outcomes central to his 
se!f-ccr!cept en'-i self-esteem; (4) Person will be more resistant to 
changing conditions about his own than about A's inputs and outcomes; 
(5) Leaving the field will occur only when there is no good alternative 
mode of inequity reduction; (6) Person will resist changing his com-
pari son other. 
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In summary, Adams' equity theory suggests that a person will feel 
inequity to the extent that his input-outcome ratio differs from that 
of a chosen or designated comparison other(s). P is predicted to 
reduce these feelings of inequity in certain ways. Ordinarily this 
will involve the actual or cognitive manipulation of inputs or outcomes, 
but may result, under conditions of extreme inequity, in disruption of 
the comparison relationship. 
Initial support for equity theory 
Prior to 1965 the findings for equity theory were that overpayment 
on an hourly pay schedule results in greater output (quantity) than in 
an equity condition whereas overpayment on a piece-rate schedule results 
in less output (Adams and Rosenbaum, 1962) but of better quality (Adams, 
1963b). Hence, in an Interview task, subjects were seen as defining 
the job in terms of turning In many interviews (quantity) in the hourly 
condition and in terms of turning in very complete interviews (quality, 
number of words per interview) in the piece-rate condition. In both of 
the above studies overpayment was created fay holding outcomes constant 
(paying all subjects in the study the same rate) and manipulating inputs. 
This was accomplished by telling inequity subjects they were unqualified 
for the task, but that they would be hired anyway and paid at the same 
rate as qualified subjects; equity subjects were told they were qualified 
for that task and would be paid at the specified rate. This procedure 
of inequity induction has been designated input overcompensation 
(wiener, 1970), Inequity was thus apparently reduced by increasing 
quantity inputs in the hourly overpayment condition and quality inputs 
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in the piece-rate overpayment condition. The decline of quality output 
in the latter case was seemingly a fortuitous result of the negative 
correlation between quantity and quality as measured in the interview 
task. 
Adams (1963a) cited an unpublished Ph.D. dissertation by Arrowood 
who investigated the possibility that the unqualified subject induction 
created differential feelings of job security in the two groups and that 
this could account for the observed differences. However, both Arrowood, 
and Adams and Jacobsen (1964) found that their "security" manipulations 
did not differentially affect responses to inequity as defined by the 
unqualified subject induction. 
Recent equity research 
Since Adams' (1965) latest theoretical statement, research on equity 
theory has dealt primarily with two questions: Identifying the limiting 
conditions under which feelings of Inequitable pay may Influence per­
formance, and the validity of the challenged qualifications Induction 
as a means for creating inequity. It is the latter with which we are 
concerned here, 
Leventhal, as primary Investigator In a series of collaborative 
studies (see below), observed subjects reactions to allocation of rewards 
after task performance. His procedure called for two people to work 
together, one of them being an accomplice of the investigators. Equity 
theory predictions were generally supported when subjects reallocated 
outcomes after the accomplice equitability or inequitabi1ity divided 
the money. The findings of these studies are; (1) inequitably treated 
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subjects attempt to reduce inequity by actual (reallocation) or cognitive 
(questionnaire responses) manipulation of inputs and outcomes (Leven-
thal, Allen and Kemelgor, 1969; Leventhal and Bergman, 19&9; Leventhal 
and Michaels, 1969; Leventhal, Weiss, and Long, 1969); and (2) when 
extreme inequity exists, self-deprivation behavior occurs (extreme 
underpayment subjects reduce their share), purportedly in order to reduce 
felt inequity by showing independence from the other member of the dyad 
(Leventhal and Bergman, 1969). It is unlikely, however, that an employer 
will engage in a reallocation relationship with an employee, in the 
same manner of Leventhal's accomplices, or that two employees would find 
themselves in such a relationship. These studies, therefore, do not 
accurately reflect the typical employer-employee relationship to which 
other researchers extrapolate at the equity concept. 
In recent studies more suitably designed to reflect on a more typical 
employer-employee relationship, procedures identical to those of Adams' 
have been employed. In piece-rate studies, equity theory predictions 
have been supported by findings of low quantity-high quality for over­
payment and high quantity-low quality for underpayment (Andrews, 1967; 
Evans and Mollnari, 1970; Lawler, Koplin, Young and Fadem, 1968; Lawler 
and O'Gara, 1967; Wood and Lawler, 1970). Piece-rate underpayment had 
not been previously investigated, thus these underpayment findings 
reflect a unique contribution to equity research by Andrews and by 
Lawler and O'Gara. The underpayment manipulation in both of these studies 
was accomplished by paying subjects less than what pre-test data indicated 
to be a fair piece-rate for the task. In the hourly pay situation, the 
equity prediction (high quantity in the overpayment condition) has 
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received some support (Lawler, 1968a; Friedman and Goodman, 1967; 
Goodman and Friedman, 1968; Wiener, 1970), although Lawler reviews this 
evidence and finds that "at the present point it is not apparent that 
equity theory is needed in order to explain the results of overpayment 
in the hourly condition" (Lawler, 1968b, p. 605). He bases this 
inference on his conclusion that in the hourly condition subjects raise 
their inputs only in response to feelings of personal inadequacy and 
not pay inequity. 
Employment of the unqualified subject induction, as originally 
developed by Adams and incorporated in the overpayment studies cited in 
the previous paragraph, has been strongly criticized. In telling a 
subject he is unqualified for the task and then hiring him anyway, it 
has been argued that the investigator is challenging the subject's self-
concept, feelings of competence, and self-esteem, rather than establish­
ing a disproportional input-outcome ratio as claimed by Adams (Lawler, 
1968b; Pritchard, I969). The suggested alternative explanation is that 
the results of such studies are due to devalued self-esteem (Friedman 
and Goodman, 1967; Wiener, 1970; Valenzi and Andrews, 1970» or personal 
insecurity (Evans and Molinari, 1970). These last four studies are the 
only ones in the equity theory literature to date which involved direct 
attempts to assess the self-esteem (security) explanation(s) in equity 
studies. Andrews and Valenzi (1970) found, in a role play situation 
encompassing a variety of inequitable treatment situations, that self-
esteem, almost to the complete exclusion of equity notions, accounted for 
large portions of the variance in subjects' questionnaire responses. 
The impact of these findings is diminished, however, by the arguments 
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for non-isomerîc relations between role-playing and experimental research 
(Freedman, 1969) and between questionnaire responses and action (Wicker, 
1969). 
Assessments of self-esteem confounding 
Friedman and Goodman (1967) administered the unqualified over­
payment (hourly) manipulation to subjects and analyzed their data in 
two ways. In their first analysis comparison of means for the equity 
and overpay groups showed no equity effect. For the second analysis 
the experimental (inequity) and control (equity) groups were dichotomized 
according to subjects' self-reported task qualifications as solicited 
prior to administration of the equity/inequity inductions. It was 
noted that means for "the two subgroups most similar to Adams' concep­
tual delineation of the experimental and control conditions (i.e. the 
unqualified experimental s and the qualified controls) are reversed 
relative to equity predictions, that Is, the unqualified experimental 
group produced fewer interviews than did the qualified controls" 
(Friedman and Goodman, 1967, p. 4l4). The unqualified experimental 
group did produce more interviews than the unqualified controls, as 
predicted by equity theory, but the difference was not statistically 
significant. Comparing their data (number of Interviews conducted) 
with Adams' (Adams and P.csenbaum, 1962), Friedman and Goodman conclude 
^  A  < 4  I  ^  ««AI *•>« «> I  f  h  1  C  A  1  ^  — r r A I  V / A H  
qualifications for the interview task. Friedman and Goodman suggest a 
restricted theory of equity that may predict responses only for certain 
people. Lawler (1968b) makes a similar suggestion, except that he finds 
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equity notions possibly applicable to piece-rate situations and not to 
the hourly overpaid situation of Friedman and Goodman. 
Wiener (1970) and Evans and Molinari (1970) manipulated the 
experimental situation so as to create differential feelings of self-
esteem and security respectively. Wiener (1970) hired subjects for 
either $2.00 per hour or $3.00 per hour as advertised in the student 
paper. Subjects responding to the ad offering $2.00 per hour were 
randomly assigned to treatments according to a design which crossed two 
types of subject orientation (task orientation - this is a psycholin-
guîstics research project; ego orientation - this is a test of mental 
alertness) with three levels of the equity manipulation (equity - you 
are qualified and are hired; input overcompensation - you are not quali­
fied, but we need subjects so will hire you; outcome overcompensation-
you are qualified and due to a recent authorization we will be able to 
pay you $3.00 per hour). Subjects responding to the ad offering $3.00 
per hour were all equity condition subjects, randomly assigned to the 
task- and ego-orientation conditions. Strong equity effects occurred 
on ratings of pay and self-ratings of qualifications, all of which 
merely indicate that the subjects understood the Inductions administered. 
Comparison of the outcome-overcompensatlon group with the $2.00 and $3.00 
equity groups, controlling for pretested task ability, showed a signifi­
cant main effect due to the equity manipulation. This was the only 
comparison to support equity predictions, however. Other analyses 
showed a significant main effect due to subject orientation (task vs. 
ego) and a significant Interaction between orientation and equity inputs 
(I.e. Input-overcornpensation), ostensively supporting the self-esteem 
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interpretation of the effects due to the equity manipulations. 
This interpretation does not stand without qualification, however. 
As Lawler (1968b) notes, if the qualifications manipulation is employed, 
the equity manipulation remains potentially confounded with challenged 
security, regardless of other manipulations included in the study. In 
Wiener's design, this confounding was present, and would have inflated 
the sum-of-squares for the orientation x conditions of equity/inequity 
interaction which Wiener claims as support for the challenged self-
esteem interpretation. 
Evans and Molinari (1970), in a piece-rate study, found that manipu­
lated insecurity was a better predictor of performance than was the equity 
manipulation. They crossed two levels of equity/inequity (equity and 
unqualified overpayment) with two levels of security (hired for four 2 
hour sessions vs. hired for the first session and then evaluated for 
possible rehire) and noted that the equity-secure group produced more 
interviews of lower quality than did the other three groups. Finding 
for a security interpretation, they suggested, similarly to Lawler 
(1968b), that the unqualified overpayment manipulation creates insecuri­
ties about guaranteed employment that are not of concern to the equity-
secure subjects, thus contradicting the earlier conclusion of Arrowood 
and of Adams and Jacobsen. Evans and Molinari did not, however, control 
for possible confounding of felt inequity and devaluation of self-esteem, 
and as a consequence their findings possess ambiguity as did Wiener's. 
The findings in studies which included a condition of overpayment 
not involving the unqualified subject induction are not clear. Andrews 
(1967) paid subjects more than pretesting indicated as an equitable 
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piece-rate and found support for equity theory. Lawler (overpayment 
by circumstance, 1968a) and Wiener (outcome overcompensation, 1970) 
told subjects that due to a recent increase In grant funds, a high 
hourly rate was possible. Lawler found no difference between this 
group and the equity group, claiming support for a challenged self-
esteem interpretation, whereas Wiener, controlling for pre-tested 
ability on the task, found differences supporting equity predictions. 
The concept of self-esteem has been notably absent from discussions 
of underpayment (Andrews, 1967; Lawler and O'Gara, 1967). While the 
self-esteem variable may be inferred to affect responses in this 
condition, as will be discussed shortly, absence of this variable from 
the discussions probably reflects two related facts. First, most 
discussions of underpayment have only been with piece-rate studies, 
and secondly, there is general acceptance of the equity Interpretation 
given of piece-rate studies (Lawler, 1968b; Pritchard, 1969). 
Only one study to date presents an avowed attempt to study 
inequity motivation in the absence of a challenge to self-esteem. This 
was accomplished . . with an Induction procedure which did not 
challenge the worker's job qualifications, eliminating devalued self-
esteem as a confounding variable" (Valenzl and Andrews, 1971). The 
Induction Involved telling Inequity subjects who had already completed 
one of two two-hour work sessions that they had been selected (at 
random) to receive a pay rate change. The change In pay was due to 
changed costs In another aspect of the project budget. Both overpayment 
and underpayment on an hourly pay schedule were employed (this is the 
first equity study published which included hourly underpay). 
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No statistically significant differences were identified for either 
quality or quantity measures on the clerical task (transferring data to 
IBM answer sheets) employed in this study. Comparing this result with 
the findings of studies previously criticized on the basis of "nonequity 
motivations" (i.e. challenged job qualifications), the authors claim 
support for the argument that significant differences identified in 
previous equity research were in fact due to challenged qualifications 
or devalued self-esteem. 
At least two related restrictions may be placed on the interpreta­
tion Valenzi and Andrews gave their study. First, one may question 
whether or not they did in fact eliminate challenges to the subjects. 
It seems probable that a person would have some questions about either 
his "to be evaluated" performance or about the study in general when 
told, regarding the pay change: "It has nothing to do with your work, 
its just a matter of chance that you were selected. It is important 
that you don't tell anyone else about your pay change. We don't want 
to cause any bad feelings among other girls working in the project" 
(Valenzi and Andrews, 1971, p. 24). Rather, it would seem "evaluation 
apprehension" (Rosenberg, 1965) might well play an active part in 
influencing task performance, perhaps even to the point of minimizing 
differences between groups. A subject's feeling of evaluation appre­
hension refers to "an active, anxiety-toned concern that he win a 
positive evaluation from the experimenter, or at least that he provide 
no grounds for a negative one" (Rosenberg, 1965, p. 29). The subject 
"would hold back . . . any evidence of having been influenced" by the 
experimental manipulation (Rosenberg, 1965, p. 32), effectively 
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eliminating differences between the overpay, equity, and underpay groups 
employed by Valenzi and Andrews. This eventuality would diminish the 
impact of the conclusion that their study supports the challenged 
qualifications interpretation of earlier equity research. 
The second restriction which relates directly to the first, is 
that the findings for hourly underpayment are ambiguous. Since the 
major purpose of the study (reducing confounding of the equity/inequity 
manipulation) may not have been accomplished, one cannot conclude that 
feelings of inequitable underpayment do not affect performance. Valenzi 
and Andrews (1971, p. 26) note, in fact, that there was an apparent 
affect on performance in this condition since "three of eleven underpay 
workers quit the job and five of the remaining six said they thought 
about quitting." 
Stronger support for their conclusion would have been mustered if 
Valenzi and Andrews had included a condition wherein subjects' self-
esteem was directly challenged, and if they had controlled for the 
possible effect of "evaluation apprehension." 
Self-esteem 
Coopersmith (196?) has defined self-esteem as "the evaluation 
which the individual makes and customarily maintains of himself; It 
expresses an attitude of approval or disapproval, and indicates the 
extent to which the individual believes himself to be capable, signifi­
cant, successful and worthy" (Coopersmith, 1967, p. 4). This seems to 
be the sense in which most equity researchers employ the term and it 
provides a different view from which to consider certain of the issues 
previously discussed. 
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Returning to some of the previously discussed studies, let us 
assume for the moment that Friedman and Goodman's (1967) self-perceived 
unqualified subjects (regardless of the groups they were assigned to 
for the experiment) had lower self-esteem than subjects who felt more 
qualified for the task. Friedman and Goodman note that the unqualified 
experimental group produced more than the unqualified control group, as 
predicted from equity theory. Qualified experimental and control 
subjects, however, performed in a manner contradictory to equity theory. 
Coopersmith (I967) suggests that people differing in level of self-esteem 
respond differently to any given situation, particularly if the situation 
entails a challenge or threat to the person's feelings of competence. 
This suggestion, in the context of Friedman and Goodman's findings, 
raises the aspect of self-esteem as a moderator of responses to felt 
inequities, at least in the hourly pay situation, a notion which Wiener 
(1970) and Evans and Molinari (1970) were unable to test since they did 
not succeed in completely dissociating the self-esteem and equity/ 
inequity manipulations. 
Self-esteem may be viewed as a moderator variable in the piece-rate 
studies as well, Andrews (1967), while not directly concerning himself 
with the concept of self-esteem, precluded its contamination of his 
overpayment condition by not employing the unqualified subject induction. 
His finding for both overpayment and underpayment, that people who had 
earneu iiiyli wages on other jobs produced more Lhan peopie wlio !iau caiTicu 
lower wages on other jobs, is compatible with the ideas that past successes 
add to one's self-esteem and confidence and that success increments the 
level at which one expects himself to perform. Korman (1967) in fact, 
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presents evidence to support a "closed loop" relationship between 
self-esteem and self-perceived abilities, such that high self-esteem 
individuals expect and achieve successes while low self-esteem individ­
uals do not expect and do not achieve successes. In the Lawler and 
O'Gara (196?) piece-rate equity study, the CPI scales (Gough, 1957) which 
were found to correlate significantly with productivity would be expected 
a priori to relate to self-esteem (i.e., poise, ascendency, and self-
assurance). Andrews' finding that quality was negatively related to 
previous high wage may reflect the negative correlation between quantity 
and quality as measured in the interview task, or taken in the context 
of Lawler and O'Gara's findings of significant correlations between 
quality and the CPI socialization, maturity, and responsibility scales, 
this may indicate differing orientations to the task by people who 
conceivably differ in level of self-esteem. 
Korman has recently presented "an hypothesis of work behavior" 
based on cognitive consistency: "All other things being equal, indivi­
duals will engage in and find satisfying those behavioral roles which 
will maximize their sense of cognitive consistency" (Korman, 1970, p. 32). 
Drawing on earlier findings, that self-esteem operates as a moderator of 
vocational choice (Korman, 1966), and the previously mentioned closed 
self-esteem loop concept (Korman, 1967), Korman proposes and finds that 
high self-esteem subjects perform better on various tasks than do low 
^ — f \/ ^  1Q7A\ Pînrlînnc 
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held for both chronic (measured) and accute ("task specific", manipulated) 
self-esteem. Korman interprets responses to inequity as indicants of 
"task specific competence," and hence amenable to his cognitive 
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consistency interpretation (he cites Adams and Rosenbaum, 1962, and 
Andrews, 1967, both piece-rate studies). Findings that in certain 
situations subjects overcompensate in response to "disconfirmed 
expectancies" (Carlsmith and Aronson, 1963; Kiesner, 1969) and 
Pritchard's (1969) proposal that certain conditions of inequity (e.g. 
high inputs and low outcomes) will be uncomfortable independently of 
the presence of a comparison person (i.e. "own inequity," Weik and 
Nesset, 1968), conform well with Korman's hypothesis. Thus, it is being 
suggested that self-esteem, the chronic good or not-so-good feelings a 
person has about himself and his capacities and capabilities, serves as 
a moderator of the manner in which a person responds to the inequitable 
treatment he experiences, independently of whether the inequity involves 
a specific attack on the individual's self-esteem. 
The present study 
Self-esteem 
The earlier evaluation apprehension and self-esteem interpretations 
of certain equity research findings was post-hoc, even though Andrews 
(1967) and Friedman and Goodman (1967) derived their measures on the 
basis of theoretical considerations (Lawler and O'Gara's (1967) were 
exploratory). No one has specifically assessed subject's level of 
self-esteem and then used this measure as an experimental variable in 
an equity study. To do so requires assessment of the individual subjects' 
level of self-esteem (i.e. chronic self-esteem) prior to the inequity 
induction. This was accomplished in the present study by having all 
subjects respond to a self-esteem questionnaire prior to being introduced 
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to the experimental task. Also required is an equity manipulation that 
is specifically designed to minimize any residual threat to the subject's 
self-esteem, thus permitting assessment of responses to pay inequities 
while experimentally controlling self-esteem (by blocking on the basis 
of the pre-measure). These precautions avoid confounding the inequity 
induction with challenged self-esteem. 
Equi ty/inequi ty 
The present study included all six cells of a factorial design 
crossing the conditions of equity/inequity (underpayment, equity, over­
payment) and schedules of payment (hourly, piece-rate). 
The comparison other 
One of the more ambiguous elements in equity research has been 
specification of A, the comparison other. Only Valenzi and Andrews 
(1971) have been more specific than to postulate that "others doing 
similar work" are receiving the same pay. This leaves much room for 
inference about whom exactly P is using for his A. In the present study, 
P specifically served as his own A. Conceiving Inequity as a violated 
expectation, conditions of equity/inequity were manipulated with reference 
to each subject's response to a question ascertaining what he felt he 
should be paid for the job he was doing (selection of one of five values). 
Hypotheses 
The following predictions tested in the present study, are consistent 
with the above conceptualization of self-esteem as a moderator of responses 
to felt inequity. 
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(1) High self-esteem subjects in the overpayment and underpayment 
conditions, on both hourly and piece-rate pay schedules, will perform 
at approximately the same level as their respective equity group. This 
prediction derives support from Korman's (1970) finding that chronic 
self-esteem accounts for a significant portion of performance variance, 
and from Coopersmith's (1967) suggestion that low self-esteem subjects 
are more susceptible to motivational manipulations than are high self-
esteem subjects. 
(2) Low self-esteem subjects in the hourly overpay and in the 
piece-rate underpay conditions will produce at a higher level (quantity) 
after the experimental induction than their respective equity group 
performances, whereas low self-esteem subjects in the hourly underpay 
and piece-rate overpay conditions will produce at a lower level (quantity) 
after the experimental induction than their respective equity groups. 
These predictions, for low self-esteem subjects, conform with those 
derivable from equity theory. 
(3) High self-esteem subjects in the piece-rate and hourly equity 
conditions will produce more than will low self-esteem subjects in these 
same conditions. In the absence of specific motivational manipulations, 
within the equity x pay schedule blocks high self-esteem subjects should 
outperform low self-esteem subjects (Korman, 1970). Differences between 
the equity condition x pay schedule blocks should also occur, in the 
direction predicted from hypothesis four or the present study. Ihese 
differences are expected to be more pronounced for low self-esteem than 
for high self-esteem subjects. 
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(4) Subjects on a piece-rate pay schedule will tend to emphasize 
quantity productivity rather than quality productivity, but there will 
be no consistent differential emphasis among subjects on the hourly pay 
schedule. 
Equity theory has received more consistent support for predictions 
of piece-rate productivity than of piece-rate quality of of either of 
the indicators in hourly pay conditions. The specific connection of 
outcomes to productivity in piece-rate conditions would logically fore­
ordain clarity and consistence among piece-rate data. Hypothesis 
number four as stated suggests that although there is no necessary 
correlation between productivity and quality measures in the present 
method (Wiener, 1970) there is a logical, empirically valid, reason to 
anticipate relative emphasis on productivity under certain of the 
experimental treatments. The arguments and counter-arguments about 
quality measures in equity theory studies do not lead to clear predic­
tions, consequently within the bounds of the present study findings 
relevant to quality data as herein scored will be considered as exploratory. 
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Method 
Subject sample 
Subjects were S6 undergraduate students recruited from Introductory 
Psychology classes at Wisconsin State Uni vers:ty-Eau Claire. The 
recruitment procedure employed required initial identification of 
potential subjects for the study (high and low scorers on the Berger 
Self Acceptance Scale, described below). A l ist of names of potential 
subjects and an accompanying sign up sheet were posted on the "sign up" 
board in the psychology department. The students were informed (via 
sign up Instructions) that names appearing on the l ist were selected 
at random. This "random selection" served as a safeguard against the 
possibility that subjects would associate the administration of the 
self-esteem measure with the experimental task. The success of this 
and other safeguards are noted in the results section. 
The following background information was obtained from each subject 
participating In the study: Sex (34 Males, 62 Females); age (X = 20.78 
years); year in college (12 Freshmen, 67 Sophomores, 9 Juniors, 8 Seniors); 
whether or not the subject had ever studied a foreign language (75 Yes, 
21 No); whether or not the subject had ever studied French (22 Yes, 
74 No). None of these variables correlated with productivity at an 
acceptable level of statistical significance. 
Independent variables and design 
Three variables were manipulated; conditions of equity/Inequity, 
pay schedule, and level of self-esteem. The basic design for assignment 
of subjects to treatment conditions was a 2 x 3 factorial, crossing pay 
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schedules and conditions of equity/inequity with an added two level 
dimension to provide for blocking on a level of self-esteem. 
Conditions of equity/inequity were manipulated in the following 
manner. Each subject indicated what he thought he should be paid for 
participation in the present project (after a period of "practice to 
familiarize" himself with the task). The subject was then told (on the 
basis of random assignment one of the following: (1) his pay would be 
as he indicated (equity), or (2) his pay would be some amount more than/ 
less than (overpay/underpay respectively) he feels he should be paid for 
the job. 
Pay schedule was manipulated by randomly assigning subjects to an 
hourly or a piece-rate pay schedule for the job. The midpoint of the 
scales on which subjects indicated what they felt they should be paid 
was anchored at $1.65 for subjects in the hourly pay condition and at 
$.17 per block of ten words (pitce-rate equivalent of $1,65 per hour as 
determined by pilot data accumulated at WSU-EC in the Fall Semester of 
1970. The $1.65 wage rate is the average paid to students at the Eau 
Claire financial aids office. 
Level of self-esteem was manipulated by blocking within the pay 
schedule x conditions of equity/inequity cells so that half of the 
subjects in each cell in the design were in the top 25% and half in the 
bottom 25% of scores on the Berger (1952) Self Acceptance Scale (see 
Shew end V/right (136?) zrd P.cbînscr; srd Shaver (?969) fo"" discussions 
of reliability and validation of this scale. The writer obtained an 
uncorrected split half reliability estimate of .804 (n = 56) and one week 
retest of .818 (n = 44). Local norms for this scale were accumulated 
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to facilitate placement of subjects. This was accomplished by presenting 
the scale to Introductory psychology classes during their regularly 
scheduled meetings. They were told the scale was "an instrument I am 
developing for a research project I hope to get started with in about 
a year," thus segregating It from subsequent association with the 
present experimental task. 
Task 
The task and instructions were those administered by Wiener (1970) 
to his "task orientation" subjects. Minor changes In the instructions 
were necessary for the present study, but they do not change the 
essential aspects of Wiener's instructions. Briefly, the task required 
that the subjects extract five-letter words from French textual material 
and perform certain manipulations related to these words. 
The task was originally designed according to the following five 
specific requirements (Wiener, 1970). (1) The task should be perceived 
as credible. (2) The task should be sensitive to motivational changes 
and should not possess an inherent Interest value. (3) The task should 
be easy to learn, and should not feature large Individual differences 
In the basic abilities involved. (4) The task should lend itself to 
simple and clear measures of quality and quantity. (5) The measures 
of quality and quantity should not correlate highly with each other so 
that independent changes In these measures can be assessed. Along with 
these criteria, use only of Wiener's "task orientation" instruction 
meets an additional criterion for the present study, that of minimizing 
the potential challenge to subjects' self-esteem. This was felt 
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necessary in order to avoid confounding the equity/inequity manipulation 
with task related feeling of competence. 
Procedure 
Subjects individually met with the experimenter at a prearranged 
time. At the outset they were (a) told they are participating in a 
project being conducted by the American Psycholinguistic Society (APS), 
(b) asked to fi l l out a "temporary employment information form" for 
"the records" of this APS project, and (c) given a brief "practice 
session on the sort of task involved in the study." 
The standard set of instructions given to all subjects after com­
pletion of the employment form was as follows (as adapted from Wiener, 
1970). 
"The sponsor of this job is the American Psycholinguistic Society, 
They work now in cooperation with several university researchers, such 
as myself, in a project that has lasted for the past several months. 
The project as a whole is about to be completed and it seems that for 
future projects of this kind, the APS won't use any more people to 
collect data, since they are developing computer programs for that 
purpose. Meanwhile, the APS prefers many people - as many as needed -
working on the job for a short time each, rather than fewer people 
working for longer periods. The reason for it is in the nature of these 
jobs, as you yourself might shortly realize. It simply turns out to be 
more efficient for them. Basically, the APS is concerned with a compara­
tive study of different languages. Very generally, this kind of research 
deals with the probability characteristics of letters, or words, or any 
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other kind of language unit. Probabilities are calculated for character­
istics like order of units, frequency of occurrence of certain units in 
given structures, and so forth. For example, in English the probability 
is 100% that "u" will follow "q". Similarly, two given words may seldom 
or never appear together. This kind of research is important to deter­
mine indices of meaningfulness of grouping of units in different languages, 
and it is essential in the comparative study of languages." 
"Your job will be basically a matter of simple counting of certain 
units in relation to others. Many different kinds of jobs of this 
nature are carried out, and the one you will be doing today is just one 
of them." 
"First, here is a sheet of sentences and a l ist of rules to follow 
for working with these sentences. Work on this sheet for about ten 
minutes to familiarize yourself with the sorts of things you will be 
doing and then we can get started on the APS job." 
Upon completion of the practice session, subjects were asked if 
they had any questions, then directed to the main task in the following 
manner. "As you can see, the only thing this job requires is trivial 
clerical abilities. Still the APS expects, of course, the people that 
work for them to get done as much as they can with a minimum of errors. 
As you know, you are going to be paid for the work you will be doing, 
which will require about an hour. One of the things I am interested 
I m # c  ^  ^k /"k ADC Tc a 
feel is a fair rate of pay for various types of jobs they are doing. 
Since I have never collected information on this type of job before, 
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I wonder if you would mind responding to this brief questionnaire for 
me before you start on the APS task." 
The question to which subjects responded prior to starting the 
experimental task was: "The task you will be doing consists of the 
same sort of thing as you were just doing, except that you will be 
extracting words from a book rather than off a sheet of sentences. 
For this work, if you were permitted to set your own pay rate, which of 
the following would be a fair wage; $1.35 $1.50 $1.65 $1.80 $1.90 
for one hour of work? (Piece-rate subjects were given the following 
scale: $.13 $.15 $.17 $.19 $.21 for each complete set of ten words.) 
After the subject responded to this question, administration of the 
experimental induction consisted of telling the subject "The prerogative 
of what to pay the participants has been left up to me by the APS and 
I have decided to pay all participants . . . For equity condition 
subjects, this statement was completed . . the amount you have 
indicated." For inequity condition subjects, this statement was com­
pleted . . (an amount one step higher or lower on the scale than 
the amount indicated, for appropriate overpay or underpay condition). 
You are probably correct in your assessment of what is a proper wage 
for your ability level, but in order to keep the bookkeeping simple, 
I am paying everyone . . . ." Any subject indicating one of the extremes 
on the pay scale, if he had been predetermined in a condition calling for 
exceeding the limits of the scale, was placed in the appropriate equity 
condition. 
Following the induction, subjects proceeded to do the task. The 
experimental task required the same performance as the practice task, 
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except that a selection of text from a French language text was 
employed in place of the standard sheet of example sentences. 
After one hour of task performance, subjects were stopped and 
asked to respond to the following questions. 
1) Please indicate by underlining what you considered to be most 
important in your performance today, l imiting mistakes or doing as many 
words as possible. 
2) If someone wanted to hire you for a job such as the present 
language task, how qualified would you think yourself to be? 
1 10 20 30 io 50 60 70 80 90 99 
unqualified fully qualified 
3) Can you make any suggestions which APS might use for improving 
this type of research? 
4) What is your feeling about the wages you are going to be paid 
for participating in this project? 
1 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 99 
less than fair more than 
fair fair 
5) What were your first thoughts when I cold ynu what you would 
actual1y be paid? 
6) In order to appeal to subjects In my own future research, what 
order of v.'çre inHtirpmpnts as influences on 
your decision to participate in the present project (1 = most influential)? 
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money offered 
extra credit offered 
learn something about psychological research 
see what the difference was between this and other projects 
I have participated in 
see if I could guess what was going on 
other (explain) 
7) What do you think this study is all about? 
After responding to this questionnaire, the subject was given a full 
explanation of what the study is about and asked not to discuss it with 
other students. All subjects were paid $2.00 for participating in the 
study. 
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Results 
Quantity data 
An omnibus analysis of variance of the number of words completed 
by each subject indicated that the only effect significant beyond chance 
levels was pay schedule (F = 4.78, p •C.05, df = 1,84, see Table 1). 
Inspection of the means revealed that subjects on a piece-rate pay 
schedule produced an average of 14.25 more words per hour than those on 
an hourly pay schedule. Manipulated equity/inequity and blocking on 
measured self-esteem did not account for statistically significant 
portions of total variance in the present study. 
TABLE 1 
Omnibus ANOVA; Number of Words Completed in One Hour 
Source df SS MS F P 
Equity (Eq) 2 517 .0996  258,5498 0.2538 
Self-Esteem (SE) 1 424.9984 424.9984 0.4173 
Pay Schedule (PS) 1 4873.5068 4873.5068 4.7847 .05 
Eq X SE 2 963.9794 481.9897 0.4732 
Eq X PS 2 4931.6917 2465.8459 2.4209 
SE X PS 1 176.0466 176,0466 0.1728 
Eq X SE X PS 2 2015.3854 1057.6927 1.0384 
F  r  rn r  Rà ACCSR CkCS ini8 ssai 
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Hypotheses 1 and 2 
Separate analyses for high and low self-esteem (HSE and LSE) 
subjects merely confirmed the above findings. Hypothesis number one, 
that there would be no differences among HSE subjects in the various 
experimental conditions received some support. None of the main effects 
or interactions in the analysis of variance for HSE subjects reached 
acceptable levels of significance (see Table 2). 
TABLE 2 
ANOVA; Number of Words Completed in One Hour By 
High Self-Esteem Subjects 
Source df SS MS F P 
Equity (Eq) 2 1143.3699 571.6850 0.6164 
Pay Schedule (PS) 1 1598.5409 1598.5409 1.7237 
Eq X PS 2 3660.7794 1830.3897 1.9737 
Error 42 38951.1353 927.4080 
TABLE 3 
ANOVA: Number of Words Completed in One Hour By 
Low Self-Esteem Subjects 
Source df SS MS F P 
Equity (Eq) 2 337.7701 168.8851 0.1522 
Pay Schedule (PS) 1 3450.9775 3450.9775 3.1098 .10 
Eq X PS 2 3286.2797 1643.1399 1.4807 
Error 42 46607.3873 1109.6997 
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Hypothesis number two, that equity theory predictions would be 
supported for LSE subjects in both hourly and piece-rate conditions, 
received no support from the present data (see Table 3). Only the 
effect of pay schedule approached an acceptable level of statistical 
significance in this analysis. Add to this the fact that all means fell 
well within the 95% confidence interval of both the highest and lowest 
means in the present design (X = 99, sd = 44.19; X 
h-eq-hse pr-eq-lse 
=140.5, sd = 30.01) and the impact of the aforementioned support for 
hypothesis number one is seriously weakened (see Table 4, Table of Means 
for Quantity data). 
TABLE 4 
Means: Number of Words Completed in One Hour 
Underpayment Equity Overpay /ment 
LSE HSE LSE HSE LSE HSE 
Piece-rate 
Hourly 
115.5 
113.0 
130.375 
107.625 
140.5 
100.375 
124.0 
99.0 
119.75 
111.5 
100.625 
113.75 
Thus the present data provide no support for the hypothesized 
differential responses of HSE and LSE subjects to manipulated conditions 
of equity/inequity and schedule of payment. Differences that do occur 
are inconsistent with those called for by equity theory and are within 
the boundary limits of expected values for random data. 
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Hypothesis 3 
Differences between HSE and LSE subjects in the piece-rate and 
hourly equity conditions were not statistically significant (piece-rate 
equity t = 1.213; hourly equity t = 0.016; df = 14). Thus the prediction 
that HSE subjects would exhibit higher productivity than LSE subjects in 
these cells was not supported. 
The corollary prediction to hypothesis three was that piece-rate 
subjects would produce more than hourly paid subjects in the respective 
equity conditions. Comparison of these groups indicates statistical 
significance in the predicted direction (t = 2.61, p ^.05, df = l4, 
see Table 4 for means). This occurs even when there is no self-report 
evidence (from the post task questionnaire) that more subjects intention­
ally emphasized productivity in either the piece-rate or hourly condition 
(10 subjects in each). 
Hypothesis 4 
The final prediction specifically evaluated in the present study 
was that subjects on a piece-rate pay schedule would tend to emphasize 
quantity rather than quality productivity while hourly paid subjects 
would not differentially emphasize either of their performance variables. 
Data to test this prediction were taken from responses to question #1 
on the post performance questionnaire. As previously noted, there was 
no numerical difference between piece-rate and hourly conditions, 
resulting in a % of zero. 
In summary then, none of the major hypotheses guiding the present 
study received support from the data. Only the corollary hypothesis, 
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that piece-rate equity subjects would produce more than hourly equity 
subjects, was supported. 
Quai 1ty data 
Findings relative to quality data (number of errors) in the present 
study were to be considered exploratory. An omnibus analysis of variance 
of these data indicated no statistically significant effects (see Table 
5). Separate analyses for HSE and LSE subjects were also non-Informative 
(for group means see Table 6). 
TABLE 5 
Omnibus ANOVA: Number of Errors 
Source df SS MS F P 
Equity (Eq) 2 2436.1401 1218.0701 0.6709 
Self-esteem (SE) 1 170.7472 170.7472 0.0940 
Pay Schedule (PS) 1 1926.0896 1926.0896 1.0609 
Eq X SE 2 1500.9913 750.4957 0.4134 
Eq X PS 2 3373.3116 1686.6558 0.9290 
SE X PS ] 5133.3735 5133.3735 2.8274 . 10 
Eq X SE X PS 2 1506.0480 753.0240 0.4148 
Error 84 152509.4847 1815.5891 
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TABLE 6 
Means: Number of Errors 
Underpayment Equity Overpayment 
LSE HSE LSE HSE LSE HSE 
piece-rate 25.5 50.625 62.75 57.0 52,25 68.5 
Hourly 58.0 32.0 57.625 36.75 41.625 36.625 
Questionnaire data 
Responses to four items on the post task questionnaire reflect 
directly on the results of the present study. Subjects' estimates of 
their own task competence (question #1) have been previously employed 
as a control condition in the analysis of equity/inequity data (Friedman 
and Goodman, 1967). These data were used in the present study to 
evaluate the relationship between this estimate, measured self-esteem, 
and task performance. 
In order to assess the success of the pay manipulation, subjects 
were asked how they felt about their pay (question #4) as well as to 
describe their first thoughts when they learned what their "actual pay" 
would be (question #5). 
The final question (question #6) asked subjects what they thought 
the study was all about. Responses to this question provided data to 
t hp  t r>  wh i rh  cuh ie r f c  a r ron feH  the  n re - f asL  py r>#»  r  !  mpn  t  A1  
Instructions. 
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Estimates of ability 
Estimates of own task ability should demonstrate relationships 
illuminating two points. First, following Korman (1967), it was antici­
pated that HSE subjects would view themselves as more qualified on the 
task than would LSE subjects. This would be supported by significant 
differences between HSÉ and LSE subjects in their responses to question 
#2 on the post task questionnaire. Secondly, it was anticipated that 
HSE subjects would have a more accurate view of their task abilities 
than would LSE subjects. This would be supported by a stronger relation­
ship between self-adjudged task ability and task performance for HSE 
than for LSE subjects. 
The expectation of differential estimates of own task ability 
received no support. In five of six experimental cells there was a 
tendency for HSE subjects to view themselves as more qualified than did 
LSE subjects. These differences, however, did not reach acceptable 
levels of statistical significance. Overall, the mean indication by HSE 
subjects (on a 99 point scale) was 72.98 (sd = 21.64) whereas for LSE 
subjects the mean was 64.71 (sd = 21.43); the difference between the 
means was not statistically significant (t = 0.384). The positive 
correlation between self-adjudged task ability and measured self-esteem 
(r = .189, p < .10, df = 95) was spuriously high due to the use of 
extreme groups. 
The nctîcr: thct HSE subjects have e more eccvraf* view of their 
abilities than do LSE subjects received tentative support from the differ­
ence of the correlations between self-adjudged task ability and task 
performance (quantity) for each group (HSE, r = .295; p ^.05; 
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LSE, r = .080, ns: df = 47). When tested by use of Fisher's z-trans-
formation, the difference between these two levels of correlation does 
not reach a conventional level of significance (z = I.06, .15>p ^ .14). 
Thus, it is suggested that HSE subjects may make more accurate 
estimates of their task performance, but do not differ on the average 
from LSE subjects in estimating their level of competence on the task. 
Fairness of pay 
Inspection of the omnibus correlation matrix indicated that the 
fairness of pay indication by subjects was correlated with cell in the 
experimental design (r = .258, p < .01, df = 95). Inspection of the 
table of means for fairness of pay responses {Table 7) indicated that 
hourly paid subjects were in fact more satisfied with what they thought 
their actual pay would be than were piece-rate subjects, irrespective 
of condition of equity/inequity (t = 2.298, p < .05, df = 94). Indeed, 
the continuum of means suggested by the correlation between fairness of 
pay and cell in the design occurred (prup < preq < prop < hup < heq < 
hop; see Table 7). 
TABLE 7 
Means: Responses on Fairness of Pay Scale 
Underpayment Equity Overpayment 
Piece-rate 59.5i2 6).25c 
Hourly 61.500 65.437 74.500 
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Fairness of pay was also correlated at an acceptable level of 
significance, although negatively, with what subjects (after the practice 
session) indicated a fair pay rate to be (r = -.283, p 4 ,01, df = 95). 
Subjects indicating a higher wage as fair were apparently less satisfied 
with what they expected to receive. Working backwards from the findings 
cited in the preceding paragraph, we note that in fact piece-rate 
subjects (who were less satisfied than were hourly subjects) indicated 
higher wage rates as fair (t - 2.437, p ^ .05, df • 94) on the equated 
five point scales employed for the fair pay rate indication. 
This relationship between pay satisfaction and fair pay rate 
Indication may be attributable to lack of familiarity among subjects with 
the type of work they were doing. Several piece-rate subjects, but no 
hourly subjects, observed loudly enough to be heard (usually directed to 
the experimenter) that they had no idea of what might be a fair rate for 
this type of work. In spite of the fact that all subjects knew the 
practice session accounted for ten minutes, only one piece-rate subject 
specifically attempted to compute what an hourly rate would be If he 
worked at the rate Indicated by his practice performance. 
Subjects' responses to the open-ended question about their first 
thoughts when they found out what they would "actually be paid" demon­
strated no consistencies that might be Informative. Consequently, these 
data do not permit a test of equity theory predictions. 
What Is the study about 
Responses to the final question on the questionnaire were analyzed 
to ascertain the success of the Instructions employed In the study. 
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Responding to the question, "What do you think this study is all about?", 
2k subjects reflected the instructions (word analysis, language study, 
etc.), and nine left the available space blank. Thus, 33 subjects 
explicitly accepted, or at least did not overtly reject, the setting of 
the present study. Twelve subjects retrospectively viewed the study in 
a manner credibly related to language skills study (learning, thinking, 
following directions, reading ability) and 18 subjects indicated they 
did not know what the study was about if not according to the instructions. 
Thus, 63 subjects appear to have generally accepted the setting of the 
study as valid. 
One might be "tempted to conclude" that since 1/3 of the subjects 
in the present study responded divergently from the intent of the 
instructions, the instructions were not sufficiently clear. This 
reasoning is not credible on two counts. First, they were essentially 
the same instructions employed by Wiener (1970) in a study which achieved 
statistically significant relationships. Secondly, it is not possible to 
assess the degree to which these divergent responses may have been the 
product of the specific question itself. In other words, upon being 
asked what the study was about, some subjects may then have reviewed 
the preceding 1 1/4 hours and fabricated a response to the question. 
There is no way to determine that responses to this question related to 
a directive influence on task performance. Moreover, an analysis of 
variar.cs of data frcm the £3 :ubj=ct: v;hc cppscr to have accept*^ fh* 
study as valid, yielded no significant main effects, essentially repli­
cating the analysis for data from the total sample. The interaction 
between equity and pay schedule reached significance at the .05 level 
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in this analysis, but this simply substantiates the interpretation that 
pay schedule was an important determiner of behavior in the present 
study. It does not seem, therefore, that inferred "non-acceptance" of 
the investigator's instructions can explain the present data. 
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Di scussion 
Equity/inequity 
The present findings do not support equity theory. They are based 
on different and possibly more sound evidence than has been previously 
offered. 
Four possible inferences about subjects' performance in the present 
study merit consideration. These four alternatives (A - subject insensi-
tivity to the equity manipulation; B - "evaluation apprehension"; 
C - all subjects were in an overpayment condition; D - insufficient 
differences of amounts "paid" to subjects) are competing explanations 
for the lack of predicted significant differences among the various 
equity/inequity conditions. 
(a) The first explanation to be considered is that subjects in the 
present study were insensitive to the equity/Inequity manipulation, 
viewing it as irrelevant to performance in the present study. 
On the post task questionnaire, subjects were asked for their "first 
thoughts" upon learning what they would "actually" be paid. Twenty-five 
subjects indicated that the money made no difference to them, that they 
would have participated in the study even if money were not involved. 
Another eight subjects responded in a manner suggesting a lack of 
pecuniary motivation ("no big incentive", "not overwhelmed", "always paid 
more than you are worth", "| didn't have the right to question", "I 
^ ^ ^  Ï J ^ .A £ £ ^ AM ^  J ^ J * A- ^  ^  ^ M MM # ,  ^M  ^^  
i i a v w  w  i  i  c  *  c  w  l k j  uk j  i  c  i  i  c c  ,  i l i J i l C  ,  *  c  a  u i ^ c  w w  i i s  my w  y  L .  
paid for", "made me giggle"). Thirty-four percent of the present sample 
were thus apparently immune to the payment manipulation. 
h]  
Of those subjects who did report being affected by the manipulation 
(e.g., "I thought it was great"), some may have responded merely as a 
result of the question being posed. It is possible that for some the 
very presence of the question induced a response at variance with any 
indifference they might have felt at the time of the manipulation. Even 
if this did not occur for any of the remaining subjects, a significant 
portion of the present sample probably viewed the monetary manipulation 
as irrelevant to their performance in "psycholinguistics" research, or 
research itself. 
A large number of subjects (29) indicated that their primary motive 
for participating in the study at all was to obtain "points" (examination 
credit in their general psychology class), whereas only 13 indicated 
money as their primary incentive. Thus, it seems that performance 
differences in response to a monetary manipulation did not occur in the 
present study due to subjects' insensitivity to the manipulation. The 
financial inducement was probably irrelevant to differential performance 
on the present task. 
(B) It is also possible that there was some ambiguity among subjects 
regarding the purpose of their participation. This might have caused 
feelings that they were being "psychologically evaluated". 
During the debriefing, a number of subjects said such things as, 
"I wondered what you were up to. Why would a psychologist do this sort 
of research; this is different from other experiments I have been in." 
These reactions indicate that some subjects apparently did not fully 
accept that they were working for the "American Psycholinguistics Society" 
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on a language research project. Rather, they seemed to view their par­
ticipation in this study as "another experiment". On the post task 
questionnaire, six subjects indicated "see if I could guess what was 
going on" and one indicated "see what the difference was between this 
and other projects I have participated in" as their primary reason for 
participating in the present study: nine indicated the former and 
thirteen indicated the latter as secondary reasons. These responses are 
artifacts of the larger research environment. During the past year, the 
course in experimental psychology at the institution where the present 
data was accumulated has undergone a significant expansion, including 
implementation of a formal policy for participation of general psychology 
students in psychological research to earn examination credits. Conse­
quently, many of the subjects participating in the present study were 
not naive of psychological research, although they were naive of 
"dissonance theory type" research. Viewing the present study as an 
"experiment" rather than the sort of research described by the experi­
menter, subjects might have experienced "evaluation apprehension" in 
similar manner and with the same results as previously discussed relative 
to Valenzi and Andrews' (1971) research. 
(C) The third possible explanation is that in the present study, 
indeed one could argue that in most equity research, the only condition 
to have been adequately represented is overpayment. With the exception 
of Wiener's (1970) study, subjects have generally arrived at an appointed 
meeting place with no clear idea of what to anticipate as remuneration 
for participation. As a consequence, subjects might view any payment as 
more than anticipated, particularly if the subjects bring inaccurate 
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preconceptions about remuneration to the task. If subjects anticipated 
only token payment, anything they were told would probably be higher 
than their expectation and thus be considered operationally an overpayment. 
Two items in the present study suggest such might have occurred. 
First, on the post task questionnaire, only five subjects (1 piece-rate 
underpayment, 1 piece-rate overpayment, 3 hourly underpayment) indicated 
that their "actual" pay was less than fair (fair = 50 on a 99 point 
anchored scale). Secondly, fourteen students from the same population 
as the experimental sample served as a pilot group in order to establish 
equivalence between the hourly and piece-rate pay schedules. No mention 
of money was made to these subjects, although the instructions adminis­
tered were identical in all other respects to those for the experimental 
subjects. Mean performance by this group was 95.5 (sd = 31.46) words in 
one hour. This contrasts with a mean of 114,67 (sd = 32.19) words 
accomplished in one hour by the 96 subjects in the study and is less 
than any of the twelve group means in the study. The distributions overlap 
extensively and the difference between means is not statistically signif­
icant (t = 2.12, df = 108). The difference is, however, in the direction 
one would predict comparing performance of subjects expecting to be paid 
as opposed to subjects not expecting to be paid for their work. 
It appears then that money may have been an effective motivator in a 
general sense, inducing higher average performance for those paid than for 
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creating performance differences among those paid, 
(D) Finally, it is possible that the pay differentials employed in 
the present study were too small to be effective. Most equity theory 
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studies have employed the unqualified subject Induction. By this 
procedure all subjects are paid the same amount, although some are lead 
to believe they are overqualified (underpaid) or underqualified (overpaid) 
for the task. Three previous studies have employed manipulation of the 
actual amounts of money subjects were led to believe they would receive 
as the primary method for creating inequity (Andrews, 1967; Wiener, 1970; 
Valenzi and Andrews', 1971). 
Andrews (1967) identified by pretesting a piece rate equivalent to 
a preset hourly rate for his equity condition. He then arbitrarily 
subtracted $.05 per piece for underpayment and added $.10 per piece for 
overpayment. Wiener (1970) arbitrarily established $2.00 and $3.00 hourly 
pay schedules. Valenzi and Andrews (1970 paid equity subjects "the 
going rate" on campus ($1.40), They arbitrarily increased this by $.60 
to $2.00 for their overpayment condition and decreased this by $.20 to 
$1.20 for their underpay condition. It seems too obvious to be worth 
noting, but there is no convention for describing what amounts represent 
inequitable overpayment or underpayment. One might question, however, 
that in the light of the rather large differences employed by these 
authors, the $.15 per hour or $.02 per ten words differences employed in 
the present study were too small to create feelings of inequity. This 
question is all the more pointed since no inequity effects were noted in 
the present study. 
Dste collected subsenuenf fr» thf» rnmpletion of this studv lend some 
credence to this argument. Six (overpayment) subjects were run up to, 
but not including, performance on the experimental task. They were then 
interviewed by the investigator to ascertain if they felt one step above 
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or below what they indicated as fair would be an unfair amount to pay 
for performance on this task. Four of the six subjects indicated that 
the one step difference would not be unfair and two indicated that it 
would be unfair. The validity of this data as support for the above-
mentioned criticism is difficult to assess, however. Of the group of 
four, one also spontaneously indicated that the only reason for partici­
pation in the study was out of interest, one participated for research 
credits, and one indicated that her response would not be valid for a 
person in less financial need than she (she would have considered 
"almost any amount" to be fair). These statements more strongly 
indicate the irrelevancy argument posed earlier, rather than the present 
argument of insufficient differences. 
Another compelling argument also invalidates this fourth alternative 
as a plausible explanation for the present findings. The pay intervals 
employed are valid indicators of pay differentials in the present 
research setting. The rates of pay offered by the local financial aids 
office are widely publicized and are common knowledge among students 
where the study was conducted. For the type of task employed in the 
present study, clerical assistants at this university are paid $1.60 
per hour. This is the lowest level of pay available through the financial 
aids office. Technical assistants are paid $1.75 and tutors $1.90. These 
pay differentials are of the same magnitude although the absolute levels 
are lower than the top three levels employed in the present study. 
If two students at this university were doing "clerical" work, one 
of them paid as a clerical assistant but the other receiving the pay of 
a technical assistant, a logical presumption (assuming they know each 
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other's pay rate) would be that the first would feel cheated (i.e. under­
paid) and/or the second would feel elated (I.e. overpaid). To validate 
this assumption, the investigator asked several "work study" participants 
how they would feel under such a differential pay scheme. In every case 
It was considered "unfair". In this context, It would seem absurd to 
tell someone that "although you think $1.65 ($.17) is fair, you will be 
paid $2.55 ($.29)." This large a difference Is clearly uncalled for by 
the type of work subjects were engaged in and would in fact open the 
study to greater criticism on the question of credibility than on the 
present basis of too small pay differentials. 
If support for equity theory is dependent upon pay differences 
which are so great that they extend beyond credible pay levels, the 
practical significance of the data and hence the theory Itself would be 
highly questionable. 
A further argument to consider Is that inequity effects were differ­
ent for subjects indicating different amounts of pay as "fair" after 
the initial ten-minute practice session. This argument would suggest 
that subjects marking one of the extremes on the five-point scale as 
fair might respond differently than subjects marking one of the middle 
three values, when told what their "actual" pay would be. Inspection of 
the omnibus correlation matrix and the separate correlation matrices for 
the HSE-LSE dichotomy and the piece-rate hourly dichotomy were unlforma-
tive. In order to determine if the low correlations were due to curvi­
linear relationships, separate scatter plots for the total data set and 
for the six pay schedule x equity/Inequity blocks were prepared. None 
demonstrated consistent relationships upon visual Inspection. The only 
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outstanding occurrence was the large number of equity condition subjects 
(15) who indicated one of the extremes as "fair". This was expected, 
however, due to the procedure for subject assignment, but had no dis­
cernible effect on the mean or variability of scores for these subjects. 
Thus, three (A, B, C) of the four possible explanations for the 
present equity/inequity results have data to support them. The writer 
is more inclined to accept the irrelevancy argument (a) for the present 
study, since the evidence supporting this inference seems more substantial 
than for the other two alternatives. The arguments of (B) "evaluation 
apprehension" and (C) overpayment of all subjects cannot be rejected 
out of hand, however, and deserve future investigation. 
The notion of irrelevancy has both theoretical and practical impli­
cations. Prior to examining these implications, however, the present 
self-esteem findings and a reformulated concept of "equity" will be 
discussed. This will permit analysis of the irrelevancy argument, 
touching on both its theoretical and practical Implications, in the 
context of the present study )nd leading toward a sound alternative to 
equity theory itself. 
Self-esteem 
The preceding discussion has centered on the manipulation of pay. 
Consideration must also be given the variable of self-esteem in the 
present study. Irrelevancy of the monetary manipulation does not explain 
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esteem subjects. 
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Korman (1971, p. 46), presenting a theory of self-consistency (also 
derived from cognitive dissonance theory), reviews eleven studies as 
supporting his conclusion that "individuals will perform in a manner 
consistent with their self-conception." 
Two overlapping considerations may point to an explanation of the 
divergence in the present study from others which support the hypothesized 
performance - self-esteem relationship. These are the fact of different 
indices of self-esteem in the various studies cited and the notion of 
task specific self-esteem. 
In the studies cited by Korman (1971) the self-concept measures 
that were employed typically related specifically to the task employed 
in each particular case (e.g., previous task performance, estimate of 
own competence on the task). One would not expect, therefore, that the 
various measures employed would necessarily correlate with each other as 
estimates of the individual's self-concept in a global sense. It is 
exactly this sense of task specific self-concept in which Korman (1970) 
discusses equity theory research. The Berger scale employed in the 
present study, however, is an attitude scale assessing generalized or 
global self-esteem, in terms of interpersonal relationships and person­
ality characteristics (e.g., "I don't question my worth as a person, even 
if I think others do."). The validation evidence for this scale, as 
reviewed by Robinson and Shaver (1969) and by Shaw and Wright (1967), 
comes predominantly from clinical assessments of personality or pathology 
(e.g., stuttering), not from task productivity assessments. If one could 
conceive of a task for which personality characteristics were relevant 
determiners of performance, then perhaps differences as measured by the 
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Berger scale might relate to performance differences. Such was not the 
case in the present study; hence, the assumption that threat to opera­
tional ized self-esteem was minimized in the present study is credible. 
It seems, therefore, that for equity theory research, the appropriate 
procedure is assessment of task specific self-concept. An assessment 
may be obtained perhaps by conducting two performance sessions, with 
subjects evaluating their own abilities on the task after the first 
session. In a sense this is what was done by Friedman and Goodman (196?) 
finding some support for equity theory. They had subjects estimate their 
task qualifications prior to the equity/inequity induction and prior to 
collecting any data. The task they used (interviewing), however, 
represents a more familiar domain of behavior (face-to-face communication) 
than the clerical task employed in the present study. Valenzi and Andrews 
(1971) had subjects perform on their clerical task for two sessions but 
did not accumulate the type of data necessary to test these notions. 
(Other studies employing a repeated measures design, e.g., Lawler and 
O'Gara (1967), Lawler (1968a), have shown only that "equity" phenomena 
created by the unqualified subject induction, dissipate over time). By 
having subjects estimate their task qualifications, however, one would 
be creating the conditions both necessary and sufficient to threaten 
subject self-concept. Any public statement of self-appraisal may be 
viewed in this light, hence it would seem that equity effects cannot be 
achieved without incurrlna some threat to subiects' self-esteem or self-
concept. Therefore, unless the subjects are In a position to relate the 
task to some aspect of their self-concept, and the investigator accumulates 
the appropriate data, the conditions would seem to proscribe identification 
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of the self-esteem - task-performance relationship. Further, as these 
conditions are identifiable in previous "successful" equity research, 
the threatened self-concept interpretation of these studies is all the 
more credible. 
The equity concept reconsidered 
Opsahl and Ounnette (1966) note that very little is definitive about 
the pay-performance relationship. They go on to commend Adams for his 
derivation of equity theory as a start toward clarifying this relation­
ship. The present study suggests, however, that equity or inequity as 
proposed by Adams are not viable predictive constructs, unless the 
individual's (task-specific) self-concept is taken into consideration. 
That is, to be effective as a determiner cf performance, pay inequity 
must be conceived as relevant to one's self-concept, more than simply 
a variable in a performance-outcomes ratio. To do this, pay must provide 
accurate information to the recipient about his performance relative to 
expected or others' performance and/or it must be viewed by the individual 
as one of his set of goals. 
The irrelevancy argument proposed by the writer is an analogue of 
the threatened self-concept argument. Threat to feelings of self-
competence by an experimental manipulation would be clearly minimized if 
the manipulation was irrelevant to subjects' performance in the study. 
It is not totally surprising that subjects viewed pay as irrelevant 
to their performance on the present task. Specific efforts to dissociate 
the amount of pay from possible challenge to self-concept seem to have 
been successful. The fact that a "relevant" manipulation might be 
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required to achieve "equity" results was demonstrated by Lawler, Koplin, 
Young, and Fadem (1969), who obtained a positive correlation between 
productivity and expressed need for money (subjects were hired through 
a newspaper advertisement). This finding is fully consistent with the 
notion that performance is related to goal or intention, but not related 
to pay when intentions are controlled (Locke, Bryan, and Kendall, 1968). 
Thus, if one wishes to study job "equity", goals or intentions would seem 
to be more salient than pay as a variable of interest. Pay equity would 
then be of interest only if pay is part of the individual subject's goal 
set. 
Money may have been a goal for some in the present study (i.e., 
subjects responding to question #6 "money offered" as the first or second 
most influential inducement for participation). The thirty-seven subjects 
thus identified, however, had a mean of 109.27 (s.d. = 31.38) on the task. 
This is well within the 95% confidence interval of the overall mean. 
Therefore, if money was an inducement to participation as mentioned 
earlier, it evidently was not viewed by subjects as an inducement to 
differential levels of performance. The motive to participate must have 
been satisfied by the realization that they would in fact be paid. The 
irrelevancy problem could have been eliminated from the present study 
only by making certain that the motivational manipulation employed was 
relevant to participation in the project. For example, if it were possi­
ble to manipulate examination credits obtained through participation, 
one would predict a greater probability of performance differences related 
to this specific manipulation than to variable amounts of money (at least 
for another sample drawn from this same population). Another possibility 
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is a different method of selection, perhaps from a somewhat different 
subject population, for which monetary payment would be more salient 
(e.g., by running an advertisement in the campus newspaper or even the 
local public newspaper). 
Thus, if the amount of expected pay had provided some information 
to subjects concerning their ability to perform (i.e., if subjects had 
been recruited by an advertisement and/or if pay had been tied to their 
practice period performance), a suitable threat might have been present. 
The predicted equity/inequity effects should then have occurred. Since 
these effects did not occur, apparently due to successful minimization of 
threat to self-concept on two counts (lack of threat in the experimental 
induction procedure and a motivational manipulation viewed by the subjects 
as irrelevant to differential task performance), the threatened self-
concept explanation of previous equity theory research assumes increased 
validity. 
This being the case, the experimental results which had previously 
been interpreted as supporting equity theory need to be reconsidered, 
at least from the point of view of the motive base for behavioral differ­
ences. The simplified input/outcome ratio, while appealing conceptually, 
seems inappropriate for explanatory purposes. Rather, differences seem 
more probably to have been created by the arousal of threats to the 
Individual subjects' self-concept. 
A revised or redefined concept of equity may perhaps remain as a 
viable predictive construct. One may stil l speak in terms of inequitable 
disparity between investments and outcomes. For predictive purposes, 
however, relevant investments and outcomes may be limited to those which 
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are potentially psychologically threatened. Manipulation only of valid 
indicators of a valued performance competence would thus yield "equity" 
results. It is doubtful, however, that predictions relating to such a 
manipulation would be derived from a theory of "equity". Unfortunately, 
the present study does not contain data appropriate to test the util ity 
of this reformulation. 
Alternatives to equity theory 
Expectancy theory (Vroom, 1964; Porter and Lawler, 1968) and Self-
Consistency theory (Lecky, 194-5; Korman, 1971) provide current alterna­
tives to Adams' equity theory. 
Vroom's (1964) theory postulates performance (the force to perform) 
as a multiplicative function of the valence (preference) of outcomes and 
the expectancy (probability) that outcomes will be realized in relation 
to the given performance. Porter and Lawler's (1968) linear model 
proposes that effort (the resultant of some combination of value of 
reward and perceived effort-reward probability) combines with abilities, 
traits, and role perceptions to determine task performance. In this 
model, value of reward is influenced by satisfaction (which in turn is 
influenced by the individual's perception of whether or not rewards for 
performance are equitable), and the perceived effort reward probability 
is influenced by observation of whether or not performance of a certain 
type leads to anticipated rewards. 
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is also an example), do not explicitly state relationships as the above 
expectancy theories do. For some (e.g., Korman, 1971) this is part of 
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both the advantage and disadvantage to this theoretical orientation. 
The fundamental postulate of self-consistency is that an individual's 
performance may be understood as an attempt to attain or maintain 
consistency in his perception of himself and his environment (of which 
the investments - rewards relationship may in fact be but one component). 
Irrelevancy finds expression in each of the above theoretical 
positions. For Vroom, irrelevancy is reflected in a zero valence, 
". . . when the person is indifferent to attaining or not attaining 
(the outcome)", (Vroom, 1964, p. 15). For Porter and Lawler (1968) 
irrelevancy would be reflected in a value of reward equal to zero. For 
self-consistency, theorists Irrelevancy Is reflected in a lack of per­
ceived relationship between two thoughts, attitudes, variables, cognitions 
(Korman, 1971, p. 4l), for the subject. 
Accepting the irrelevancy minimized threat interpretation of the 
present data, the superior alternative to equity theory, In a post hoc 
analysis, is expectancy theory. The present study was conceptualized on 
the assumption that equity/Inequity data could be explained by equity 
theory, employing self-esteem as a control variable. This assumption has 
received no support from the present study. The self-consistency theories 
are unable to explain the differences between pay schedules Identified 
in the present study. This performance difference is predictable, 
however, from an expectancy theory analysis. 
According to Lawler: 
. . . .  e x p e c t a n c y  t h e o r y  c a n  b e  s a i d  t o  e m p h a s i z e  p e r s o n s  t r y i n g  
to maximize their positive outcomes, while equity theory emphasizes 
persons trying to balance their Inputs against their outcomes. 
(Lawler, 1968b, p. 598). 
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The difference between piece-rate (121.79) and hourly (107.54) means for 
the productivity data is as predicted by expectancy theory. This differ­
ence is sensible according to the theory since a piece-rate pay schedule 
allows subjects greater flexibility than an hourly pay schedule to 
maximize their positive outcomes. One would therefore expect greater 
productivity for subjects paid on a piece-rate pay schedule, all other 
things being equal. 
Our earlier reasoning that pay inequity effects may occur only when 
pay is a relevant goal, or is viewed as important to the individual's 
self-concept, also finds expression in expectancy theory. Porter and 
Lawler (1968) include this provision in their expectancy theory analysis 
by specifically calling for a clear performance - rewards relationship. 
The higher the perceived probability that pay depends upon job 
performance factors, the more effort an individual will devote 
to performing his job effectively. (Porter and Lawler, 1968, 
p. 62). 
Thus, the present study clearly supports expectancy motivation as 
the primary influence on job or task performance and not equity motivation. 
The expectancy theory analysis of earlier "equity" studies is thus 
supported, the conclusion being that the results obtained in those 
studies must have been due to threats to self-esteem aroused by the 
induction procedure, rather than unbalanced input/outcome ratios. 
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Summa ry 
Skinner (1956) presents a selection from his book, Walden Two. 
In this selection, he comments on "unsuccessful" attempts at research: 
Eventually I realized that the subjects were always right. 
They always behaved as they ought. It was I who was wrong. 
I had made a bad prediction. (Skinner, 1956, p. 233). 
In the present study, "bad" predictions were derived from equity 
theory. The equity/inequity maniuplation was irrelevant to subjects' 
performance in the study since it did not reflect on a valued aspect 
of the individual's self-concept (i.e., task performance). Predictions 
concerning level of self-esteem were "bad" due to the fact that global 
rather than task specific self-esteem was assessed. The success with 
which threats to self-esteem were eliminated from the experimental 
induction procedures, along with the absence of an assessment of task 
specific self-esteem, shielded subjects from threats to self-esteem 
which appear to be a necessary condition for the occurrence of "equity" 
phenomena. Significant differences were noted only for pay schedule 
grouping (piece-rate versus hourly). The only theoretical formulation 
capable of accounting for this result, in the context of the other 
findings, is expectancy theory. 
Equity theory as originally proposed seems insufficient for the 
domain in which it purports to predict, without major modification. The 
writer agrees with Lawler that a concept l ike equity may help elaborate 
one aspect of traditional (expectancy) motivation theory (Lawler, 1968b, 
p. 609). 
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